Aronson's piece examines the topic I touched on in my previous blog post (May 31), namely, the president's diplomatic detachment on Syria. Also discussed is how, all the while, the United States continues to provide various "moderate" Syrian rebel groups with more than the claimed non-lethal aid. This has been a poorly kept secret for some time now, and with the involvement of allies like Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, the US administration can claim distance and ignorance.
Yet, the Syrian opposition is not getting the arms it wants, specifically, anti-aircraft weaponry. Light arms and training make up the bulk of what's being offered, with the recent appearance of American anti-tank missiles of unknown provenance—likely Saudi, with quiet US approval.
In the grand scheme of things, the supplies to the rebels are a trickle. It would therefore seem the White House is striking a balance between its support for the opposition and what amounts to a kind of support for the Bashar al-Assad regime. All things remaining equal, Assad looks to be the eventual victor in the current civil war. Given this scenario, a possible outcome that might be acceptable to the externally involved parties—principally, the United States and Russia—will be the regime left in place minus Assad.
It is important to bear in mind that the United States isn't terribly concerned about Assad. He's a known quantity and doesn't pose much of a threat to anybody, apart from his own people. Furthermore, Syria is non-critical to US geostrategy: it keeps to itself, lacks significant natural resources, and carries little regional clout.
Obama's stated priority about jihadist elements is doubtfully a real worry. The administration would probably prefer to avoid arming these groups, though introducing arms into a civil war where the opposition is fractured and known for infighting creates this very possibility. The White House clearly sees this as an acceptable risk. All the same, the primary goal is to keep things basically as they are, with Assad's power diminished just enough.
As Obama said in his recent speech at West Point, "I will work with Congress to ramp up support for those in the Syrian opposition who offer the best alternative to terrorists and brutal dictators." Taking him at his word, if we subtract the jihadist/al-Qaida-affiliated groups from the picture along with Assad, what remains is the regime's structure and possibly some kind of deal acceptable to leaders of the Free Syrian Army and the Syrian National Coalition. In other words, the status quo ante with a new face, as now exists in Egypt.
This approach to management is vintage Uncle Sam and has characterized much of how the United States has operated in the Middle East: providing counterbalance to prevent unpredictable change while keeping things off-kilter enough to justify pursuit of "best alternatives." Meanwhile, Syria burns.
