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March 15, 2020

Why We're Polarized


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Depending on your circumstances, you might have more downtime on your hands as of recent. If you're looking for something to read, I just finished and would recommend Ezra Klein's new book Why We're Polarized.

Klein, co-founder of Vox, offers a clear and informative analysis of when and how American politics became so severely sorted and polarized around the two major political parties, with their corresponding liberal and conservative ideologies.

It is routinely pointed out on this blog that Americans are not operationally divided; that is, they tend to be in agreement when discussions take place outside the bipartisan framework—what I call the "blue-red circus tent." (This is something I wish Klein would have addressed, though he only hints at it, on page 159).

Yet, Americans are indeed politically divided, as we see time and again in election results. And Klein does an excellent job making this comprehensible. For those who are interested in these things—or simply have questions—but are maybe hesitant to tackle a book on politics, Klein's writing is clear, non-technical, and oftentimes entertaining. He doesn't assume you eat, live, and breathe policy. And though a liberal Democrat, he doesn't do a hatchet job on conservative politics. The tone of the book is steady and explanatory. Almost to a fault.

And regardless of how much politics is in your diet, readers stand to learn a lot. Klein lightly (in a good way) surveys US political history, showing when American politics began to take this polarized turn. He examines the role of the news media, highlighting the feedback-loop that now exists. As he states, "institutions polarize to appeal to a more polarized public, which further polarizes the public, which forces the institutions to polarize further, and so on" (p. 136–7). Demographics, of course, receive thorough treatment. And one of the book's principal strengths is Klein's reconsideration of the central role of identity politics, which he breaks down nicely.

Moreover, and though not a focus of the book, Klein does provide clarity with regard to the 2016 election and Trump's overtaking of the Republican Party. Regardless of where you sit politically, I think Klein's analysis will be of interest. He also offers a warning about what the current atmosphere of polarization can invite.

In a blog post entitled "Trump, the Squad, and taking solace" (Jul. 27, 2019), I expressed a kind of relief that Trump is not better or worse than he is. That despite enormous character flaws and deficiencies, he is not an ideologue. He is not a believer. And Klein makes a similar point: that we're lucky. As he puts it:

In an era of high polarization, weak parties, and strong partisanship, it's easy to see how extremists and, more than that, demagogues penetrate the system. America was lucky, if that's the right word, that Trump proved himself, once in office, distractible, lazy, and uninterested in following through on his most authoritarian rhetoric. He's done plenty of damage, but he's not emerged as a dictator in control of American political institutions, as many liberals feared in the direct aftermath of the election. But the word also produces clever, disciplined demagogues. They are the ones who truly threaten republics, and they are watching. (p. 196)

Quite right. We should be concerned. Polarization threatens everybody. And it has made its way into areas of our lives one might not expect. Like pandemic virus outbreaks, for example.

As reported in the New York Times (Mar. 13),

In a Quinnipiac University poll released this week, roughly six in 10 Republican voters nationwide said they were not especially concerned that the coronavirus would disrupt their lives. Two-thirds of Democratic voters said the opposite. All together, a slight majority of Americans expressed serious concern. 
And Democratic voters were about twice as likely as Republicans to worry that they or someone they knew could catch the virus, the poll found. Sixty-three percent of Republican voters said they were relatively unconcerned.

In other words, even how one responds to national emergencies passes through the identity filter. One identifies as a "conservative," then one listens to "conservative" pundits (who are playing down the pandemic as a bunch of liberal hysteria), and one therefore adopts that view. What Klein does in his book is take you to the source of why this is happening, why it's gotten so bad, and a few words about what can be done about it.

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