Operation Protective Shield's goal is the same as 2012's Operation Pillar of Defence, and 2008-09's Operation Cast Lead: to contain Hamas but not obliterate it. Israel knows that eliminating Hamas, even if possible, could leave a vacuum filled by organisations more militant, more radical and less palatable. "It's a fine calibration between weakening Hamas enough and not weakening it too much. Netanyahu still wants Hamas as the address in Gaza, otherwise there will be chaos and mayhem," said [Daniel Levy, Middle East director of the European Council for Foreign Relations].
As mentioned in my July 13 blog post and discussed at more length in my "It's Not about Hamas" article (May 2), regarding the current situation Israel is motivated by two principal concerns: a strong disinterest in negotiating with the Palestinians and a strong interest in Hamas maintaining its role in Gaza.
When Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas announced on June 2 the creation of a transition government—one that did not include members of Hamas and garnered broad international approval—Tel Aviv went into panic mode. Israel very much prefers the Palestinians divided into two separate territories and under two separate, antagonistic leaderships.
Israel therefore opted to push the Gaza button: to stress the unity government and move Hamas into a less political, more militant footing. After conducting mass arrests of Hamas members in the West Bank in June following the kidnapping of three Israeli teens there, and carrying out airstrikes on Gaza tunnels that claimed the lives of Hamas militants and wounded civilians, rockets began streaming out of Gaza. Israel now had its pretext.
In short, this latest dose of cruelty dealt to the people of Gaza is simply about Israel's aversion to a diplomatic settlement of the conflict.
