Egyptians have a long and legitimate list of grievances, including under the brief administration of Morsi, the nation's first democratically elected executive. Yet, there was an ominous amount of faith placed in the military establishment that summer. And perhaps unsurprisingly, General (now Field Marshal) al-Sisi and company took advantage of the post-Morsi situation. As things sit, al-Sisi will likely be a candidate in upcoming presidential elections.
During July's demonstrations, and given Tamarod's support for the military, one could be forgiven for wondering if something was amiss. New information, however, has come to light. According to Reuters, Tamarod has split into factions, with a new group—Tamarod 2—denouncing the original organization's leaders:
One reason cited by disaffected Tamarud members for breaking away is what they said were ties between the group's founders and state security agents who influenced and guided them. ... Police and state security officials told Reuters last year that the Interior Ministry had supported Tamarud's campaign. Tamarud leaders have denied police had infiltrated the group, but some members have privately admitted that some of its founders had been planted by state security.
As one Tamarod 2 leader summarized, "We wanted the army to help us oust Mursi, not take over power itself."
This clarifies the context of Morsi's removal and the subsequent repressive tactics against resistance - and journalism - seen since. It also indicates possibilities for the future. According to an article in the New York Times (Feb. 16) on the age gap in Egypt:
A growing number of young Egyptians say the government’s heavy-handed crackdown on any opposition is widening a generation gap, which poses a longer-term threat to stability. Three out of four Egyptians are under 40, and more than two out of three are under 35. With [al-Sisi] retracing the 60-year-old footsteps of former President Gamal Abdel Nasser [1956-70] ... young bloggers and activists are complaining that they feel caught in a time warp.
The article also points out that this generational gap exists within the Islamist community, with younger Muslim Brotherhood members seeking a cooperative approach that includes secular liberals. They are critical of how the older generation handled rule of the country.
When all these pieces are put together—the age of most Egyptians, the lessons learned, and the willingness to collaborate—another 2011 seems not unlikely.
