The instance used in the BBC article below has to do with trust. As the article reports, some view the Obama administration's handling of the situation in Egypt as damaging to America's reputation, as souring views of its integrity. This meaning of credibility is of low priority to policy planners. If the United States was distressed about how it is perceived in the Arab world, it would simply cease intervening there. From Dwight Eisenhower forward, this point has been made abundantly and painfully clear.
Then there is the second meaning: instilling in others the belief that you are willing and able to carry out a certain action. A playground bully achieves due regard and submission if he actually beats someone up occasionally. The same principle obtains in the world of organized crime. Similarly, this doctrine features in US foreign affairs. Actions (Vietnam, the 1991 Gulf War) say "we mean business" louder than words.
With regard to Egypt neither sense applies. The White House would simply prefer Cairo go back to being stable, regardless of who is in charge - be it a dictator, an Islamist president, a secular president, or a military general. On this score, the administration couldn't care less. However, due to mass popular protest and upheaval, the Egyptian population is now a major factor. (Populations are always a factor, but usually just as a background nuisance.)
This might explain why Obama and company are so agreeable lately: Hosni Mubarak was fine, then (eventually) the revolution that removed him was fine, then Mohamed Morsi was fine, and then his ouster was fine. The current violence is not really an issue - as such - but because it now threatens the country's stability, the White House is telling the military to cool it and get Cairo back to some form of electoral, democratic order. And as the administration well knows, the military will still be there and continue existing as Egypt's preeminent power, sitting quietly behind the throne.
Al Jazeera analyst Marwan Bishara's most recent essay provides sound comment on this subject. As he concludes:
Washington would've liked to see the generals refrain from violence, empower the civilian government, allow for a quick return to the democratic process, and eventually return to the barracks. But the US did not voice its opinion loud enough, and didn't make it clear to the generals that failure to heed their advice has consequences.
Bishara's point I feel is correct. Although the New York Times is emphasizing US diplomatic efforts to get the Egyptian military to de-escalate its drive against the Muslim Brotherhood. As summarized in Sunday's paper:
All of the efforts of the United States government, all the cajoling, the veiled threats, the high-level envoys from Washington and the 17 personal phone calls by Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel, failed to forestall the worst political bloodletting in modern Egyptian history.
Be that as it may, the diplomacy sounds less than vigorous. And because Obama, John Kerry, and Hagel have been speaking in softer tones, General al-Sisi and the Egyptian military establishment have been given a yellow light. Therefore, the administration bears a measure of responsibility for the recent bloodshed. This obviously does not enter into the decision making, so we can only infer that - despite the delay of fighter-jet shipments and the cancellation of military exercises - the situation in Egypt is currently within parameters.
(See also Jul. 17, 2013, blog post.)
BBC: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-23721918
Bashara: http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/08/2013814212819564477.html
