... British newspaper reports say Prime Minister David Cameron has retreated from the idea altogether. The reluctance reflects a similar attitude in Washington toward the idea of sending small weaponry to the splintered Syrian insurgents, raising broader questions about the destiny of the rebels as the flow of battle turns against them.[2]
This splintering and sometimes bloody infighting is chiefly between the secular FSA leadership and the more hardline al-Qaida-linked elements such as al-Nusra and the ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant). A major episode of this violence was the recent killing of Kamal Hamami, a member of the FSA's high command, by the ISIL. These divisions continue to increase. As a result, the West is wondering just how severe these tensions within the resistance are going to get. And if arms are supplied, where and with whom the shipments will end up.
If the already loosely structured rebellion continues to disintegrate, and internecine fighting escalates between the FSA and the jihadist groups, in a way this also - curiously - puts the regime and the FSA on the same side in an "enemy of my enemy" context. As British journalist Robert Fisk recently pondered in the Independent:
Regime intelligence officers have for more than a year held regular meetings with FSA officers to try and woo them back to Bashar. And if they are successful, then our generous donations of weapons will end up not in the Islamist "wrong hands" but the "wrong hands" of the Baath Party.[3]
This scenario is of course possible, but at present unlikely. And even if it came to pass, the shipments being considered would only consist of light arms. If the Assad regime inherits a few more machine guns, the West will in all probability get over it. However, the thought does illustrate the increasing complexities in Syria. One can also picture the scenario where, if the Assad regime survives the conflict - signs of which are currently starting to show - Washington might just prefer he remain in power. A known quantity is always preferred to an unknown.
It is doubtful that further arming the rebels, which is already occurring through the efforts of Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, would turn the tide in the FSA's favor. Doing so will only increase the bloodshed and prolong the civil war; it is worth bearing in mind that light arms will only bring the rebels up slightly, but nowhere near the fighting capacity of the Syrian army.
There is also the issue of legality. Interestingly, when one does a Google search for "arming syrian rebels illegal" the bulk of the results link to comments coming out of Moscow. The White House is, however, also mindful of international law on this issue - just more discreetly. As stated in the Wall Street Journal,
Members of the so-called Lawyers Group of top legal advisers from across the administration argued that Mr. Obama risked violating international law and giving Syrian President Bashar al-Assad the legal grounds - and motivation - to retaliate against Americans, said current and former officials. The group's arguments in part help explain why the White House agonized over Syria intervention and why Mr. Obama eventually opted to provide military aid to the rebels covertly through the Central Intelligence Agency, to help mitigate the legal risks and keep the U.S.'s profile low.[4]
As for a no-fly zone, this puts the United States and whichever European nations decide to participate in it directly involved, which the Obama administration would prefer to avoid. Moreover, according to a report in the Christian Science Monitor,
Senior military officials, for their part, have argued that a no-fly zone would be of questionable strategic value since 10 percent of the casualties inflicted by the Syrian opposition have occurred through the use of air power. "The other 90 percent are by direct fire or by artillery," said Gen. Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff....[5]
As for how the conflict affects US policy in the region, Syria is of little strategic value to the United States. It has a relatively low GDP and insignificant oil reserves. Despite not being aligned with Washington, it has been known to cooperate with it on occasion, and regardless of the tough rhetoric, generally plays nice with Israel. What the White House does fear is the civil war further destabilizing its neighbors (which is already happening) and creating broader, larger problems. The possibility of Syria breaking into pieces is also a concern, presenting an unpredictable set of consequences that would affect the entire Middle East; while Assad is hanging on and his position appears stronger than it has been in recent months, his authority only extends to about half of the country (over half the population, under half the national territory).
The solution for Syria's longterm peace and stability lies in a political, diplomatic solution, which is within the realm of possibility if the United States is willing to work toward that end, most likely in coordination with Russia. Needless to say, there is hesitancy on this score as well.
As for the American people, the vast majority is against shipping arms to Syria. According to a recent Pew Research poll, 70 percent oppose such shipments, though 53 percent "agree that it is important for the U.S. to support people who oppose authoritarian regimes."[6]
NOTES
[1] http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/15/world/middleeast/no-quick-impact-in-us-arms-plan-for-syria-rebels.html
[2] http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/17/world/middleeast/syria.html
[3] http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/who-is-the-us-arming-in-syria-president-assad-rubs-his-hands-at-news-of-rebel-split-8706540.html
[4] Adam Entous, "Legal fears slowed aid to rebels," Wall Street Journal, July 14, 2013.
WSJ link: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323848804578606100558048708.html
[5] http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Military/2013/0615/US-to-start-arming-Syrian-rebels-but-will-it-make-much-difference
[6] http://www.people-press.org/2013/06/17/public-remains-opposed-to-arming-syrian-rebels
